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U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan  




The attacks of September 11, 2001 shocked the world and wounded the United States. In a state 
of uncertainty, the US rose up in defiance, issuing strong statements that served to rally 
patriotism, threatening anyone on the other side of a solid red line: “You are either with us or 
against us.” In an act of retribution, the U.S. quickly planned to attack the perpetrators, al Qaeda. 
They were an unknown group to the American public, a stateless group of nomads who lived in 
caves and traveled along goat paths. It was a new type of enemy that used airplanes as weapons; 
the fight against them would require a new type of warfare. President Bush called it the War on 
Terror and issued a warning to anyone who harbored terrorists. Of course, Afghanistan’s 
government, the Taliban, who were recognized as legitimate by only three other governments, 
refused to turn over their guests who had been based in the country since 1997. With emotions 
running high and a sense of urgency to respond, the United States made invasion plans. 
The ultimate goal of engagement was broad: to end terrorism. Regarding Afghanistan, the 
U.S. wanted to be sure that the country would never be used to launch terrorist attacks against 
the U.S. or her allies. President Bush wanted to use Afghanistan as an example to send a message 
to other terrorist organizations that the U.S. would not end the war until “‘every terrorist group of 
global reach has been found, stopped and defeated’” (James M. Lindsay, 2001). The strategy was 
incomplete however; without a determined, well defined and measurable goal, the world’s 
greatest military power engaged in a war that has lasted ten years against an elusive and 
amorphous enemy that has been all but defeated. This paper will discuss the changing U.S. 
policy towards Afghanistan as time progressed, beginning with President Bush’s initial 
authorization to engage and the development of democracy as a goal, and then proceeding on to 
President Obama’s new strategy and the terms of the troop drawdown. The policy is long and 
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complicated; this paper will offer insight into the comprehensive timeline and general trends, and 
will touch on one possible policy avenue based solely on the United States’ recent history in the 
country.  
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGY  
President Bush prepared for war. On September 18, 2001, he signed a law that authorized 
the use of force against America’s attackers (Bruno, 2011). He looked to other countries for 
support, especially from within the region. Within a month, the 5th Special Forces Group 
(Airborne), a Special Operations Unit, had landed in Uzbekistan, bordering the north of 
Afghanistan (Stewart, 2003). From the onset, the immediate objective was to destroy al Qaeda 
and their networks of support, and the administration had “stated that it is not out to replace one 
regime with another” (Gossman, 2001) . However, the U.S. Army Center of Military History 
claims that the Army Special Forces were to “change the government of Afghanistan so that the 
country was no longer a safe haven for terrorists,” demonstrating the confusion that surrounded 
the invasion (Stewart, 2003). The plan to take the country was called Operation Enduring 
Freedom. The Special Forces aligned with a number of commanders from the Northern 
Alliance—the anti-Taliban government that had been run into a miniscule part of northeastern 
Afghanistan. The U.S. was aware of the inner-rivalry between the Afghan commanders, and 
divided the Special Forces teams amongst them evenly to avoid favoritism (Stewart, 2003). With 
global and internal support, the U.S. was ready to invade.  
Operation Enduring Freedom was the first taste of combat for most American soldiers. It 
commenced on October 7, 2001 with a bombing campaign (Bruno, 2011). On October 19, 2001, 
conventional ground forces invaded to meet up with their Afghan allies (Stewart, 2003). The first 
military success was the fall of Mazar-e Sharif, in the north on November 10, 2001 (Stewart, 
2003). The Special Forces team assigned to the local warlord, General Dostum, had divided into 
two along with the general’s men (Stewart, 2003). They moved in towards Mazar-e Sharif from 
the north and south of the city, with overhead support, until the Taliban fled. Taliban strongholds 
around the country fell quickly and without much resistance. The Taliban retreated from the 
capital, Kabul on November 13, 2001, to Kandahar, where the group had originated from, and to 
the Tora Bora Mountains.  
The military was prepared to deal with the imminent human rights issues that were to 
follow the battles. On November 20, 2001, Central Command (CENTCOM) gave authorization 
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to initiate humanitarian operations and to “create conditions for a peaceful, stable Afghanistan,” 
(Stewart, 2003) effectively expanding the objectives of the operation. This brought in more 
Army support forces, however many worked “from outside of Afghanistan since the Central 
Command was under pressure to limit the “footprint” of American troops on the ground” in an 
conscious effort to not occupy the country as the Soviets had (Stewart, 2003). Nonetheless, they 
used old Soviet bases and airstrips for their convenience. Understanding this mindset is 
important because it shows a dominant American presence in the country would subside, but also 
that attentiveness to Afghan sensitivities only stretched so far. A Combined Joint Civil Military 
Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) coordinated relief organizations (Stewart, 2003). They 
airlifted food packets to refugee camps, and dropped leaflets that “informed the Afghan people 
about their forthcoming liberation, and warned them of the dangers of unexploded ordnance and 
mines”—a thoughtful gesture considering the high literacy rate in the country   (Stewart, 2003). 
In any case, the humanitarian effort reveals caution and awareness in the military, even if just on 
a small scale.  
The first major obstacle that the operation faced had to do with prisoners of war rather 
than in the battlefield.  Towards the end of November, prisoners after a battle were taken to a 
prison in Mazar-e Sharif without being thoroughly searched for weapons and devices (Stewart, 
2003). When U.S. intelligence officers began to interrogate them, “some 600 of the “detainees” 
disarmed the guards and took over the prison compound,” capturing two intelligence agents 
(Stewart, 2003). One was killed, and the first conventional forces, a small Quick Reaction Force 
of infantry, entered Afghanistan to help (Stewart, 2003). Later in December, 2001, a task force 
was assigned to interrogate prisoners again. Having learned from this first prison incident, they 
took caution. Prisoners with “valuable intelligence were evacuated” to Kandahar, before they 
were sent to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for further interrogation (Stewart, 2003). U.S. strategy for 
handling prisoners was developing, but did not take into consideration the future ramifications 
that it would have on public and global opinion of the U.S.  
The Taliban and al Qaeda were not yet eliminated from the country, though. Kandahar 
was the last remaining major city under Taliban control. The U.S. allied with a pro-western, anti-
Taliban Pashtun—a rarity—named Hamid Karzai to attack Kandahar. It fell on December 7, 
2001 (Stewart, 2003). The Tora Bora Mountains also held an unknown number of al Qaeda 
operatives. A mostly Afghan force carried out the operation with help from Special Forces. With 
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the fall of these last two strongholds, Afghanistan was considered liberated (Stewart, 2003). The 
original goals of destroying the al Qaeda base and their network, and the early adopted one of 
overthrowing the government, had been achieved. The Northern Alliance now held Kabul, and 
warlords from before the Taliban era were restored to their mansions in their respective cities.  
Intelligence was concerned with other pockets of enemy forces and a possibility of 
guerilla warfare popping up. One such enclave of al Qaeda forces was discovered in a valley 
near the Tora Bora Mountains, and Operation Anaconda was planned to destroy it. It was the 
first major battle of the entire war, and took place from March 2, 2002 to March 19, 2002 
(Stewart, 2003). They planned to isolate the enemy and prevent escape by blocking the exits of 
the valley. With about 2,000 U.S. soldiers and 1,000 Afghans, the operation was unprepared for 
the enemy’s strength and strategy, and took heavy losses (Bruno, 2011) (Stewart, 2003). Al 
Qaeda also faced losses, and in the end, the U.S. and allies were victorious. In “Operation 
Enduring Freedom, American military power delivered a fatal blow to the Taliban and their al 
Qaeda allies for a major victory in the war on terrorism” (Stewart, 2003). The escape of Osama 
bin Laden was the only, albeit major, failure of Afghanistan, but with the country classified as 
liberated, attention shifted away from the Taliban and al Qaeda and towards the new war plans 
for Iraq. Afghanistan’s secondary position would remain throughout the duration of President 
Bush’s administration.   
AFGHANISTAN’S NEW GOVERNMENT AND SECURITY FORCE 
 In December of 2001, in Bonn, Germany, a conference was held by the United Nations 
that included all the major players interested in Afghanistan’s future government. This included 
the United States, with the demand for a pro-Western democracy, Iran and Pakistan, each 
interested in a friendly neighbor, Russia, India, various European countries, and Afghan factions, 
which included the Northern Alliance and a group representing the king, ousted in the 1970’s 
(Dobbins, 2009). They set up a process for writing a constitution and electing a government 
(World Factbook, 2011). The process took place over three stages. The first, the interim 
government, lasted for six months, and Hamid Karzai was appointed head. Then the Loya Jirga 
nominated a transitional government to take over for the next eighteen months. Finally, a second 
Loya Jirga ratified the constitution, and elections were held (Kumar, 2001). The long process 
was purposeful by the international actors because it would allow time for the chaos to calm so 
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that no person could claim an emergency reason to abandon the constitution or democracy 
(Kumar, 2001). Bringing democracy to Afghanistan was in its first stages. 
The Bonn Agreement also included guidelines on the multinational troop force that was 
to help the government achieve security and stability called the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF). The Northern Alliance originally had no desire for troops to remain, and so the 
size and mandate were meant to be much smaller than had taken place in other crisis zones, like 
Bosnia and Kosovo (Kumar, 2001). Their goals were to “deliver aid, stabilize Kabul, and train an 
all-Afghan security force” (Kumar, 2001). It became clear that stability would not come quickly, 
and the force had managerial issues as the command rotated every six months. In the fall of 
2003, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) took permanent leadership although it had 
always been under the command of a NATO member (ISAF, 2011). At the same time, the 
United Nations also expanded their mandate to all of Afghanistan, not just in and around Kabul. 
 
 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF 2002: THE DEFENDER OF FREEDOM  
In September, 2002, President Bush issued his first National Security Strategy, which 
explicates the reason the U.S. continued its operation in Afghanistan after their nominal goals 
had been reached. The preface addresses the superiority of democracy and the values of freedom, 
the latter of which are shared by all peoples of the world. It calls on “freedom-loving people 
across the globe” to protect “these values against their enemies,” and declares that the U.S. will 
defend, preserve, and extend the peace through “fighting terrorists and tyrants,” “building good 
relations among the great powers,” and “encouraging free and open societies on every continent” 
(Bush, 2002, 3). This responsibility given to humanity is an inevitable determinant of American 
action. It is narrative in style, in which the U.S. is the protagonist in a global, ongoing battle. It 
claims a bond with the great powers of the world based on their common interests, and promises 
to strengthen the “global trading community to build a world that trades in freedom” (Bush, 
2002, 4-5). It incorporates the lesson learned from Afghanistan: that weak states pose a threat 
and should be strengthened. The document puts responsibility for the free world on American 
shoulders, and the paternalistic attitude mandates that the U.S. help the world’s misguided states 
find security, stability, and democracy.  
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The entire document reiterates these ideological sentiments, and uses Afghanistan to 
justify American action, past and future. By declaring that “Afghanistan has been liberated,” the 
situation is made into an example of success (Bush, 2002, 11). That the “coalition forces 
continue to hunt down the Taliban and al-Qaida” means that America will not relent—a warning 
to countries that support terrorism or are terrorists themselves (Bush, 2002, 11). Action is further 
justified when posed as a fight for survival; it says the war on terrorism is a defense of 
democratic values and the way of life (Bush, 2002, 13). It never explicitly calls for 
democratization of Middle Eastern countries, but one cannot be surprised at the democratization 
path the U.S. pursued after having read it. It does not outline the action strategy, assessable 
goals, or actual policies in Afghanistan. 
U.S CIVIL ASSISTANCE POLICY  
U.S. policy for eliminating terrorism from Afghanistan came in a variety of forms. The 
major, ongoing effort was in the form of civil assistance to help the country stabilize. The 
Afghan interim government only wanted help where needed, so the U.S. continued the policy of 
“minimal footprint” to avoid being mistaken as an occupier force, as the Soviets were, and kept 
the number of troops in the country as low as possible. In November of 2002, the U.S. military, 
the UN, and nongovernmental organizations created provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) to 
help the government in redevelopment (Bruno, 2011). They were joint civilian-military 
organizations that performed governmental duties in cities around the country. The U.S. was in 
control of a majority of the organizations while ISAF was in control of the rest (Perito, 2011). 
They were disorganized, though, and succeeded in little else than as security for aid 
organizations (Bruno, 2011). In 2003, Donald Rumsfeld declared an end to major combat and a 
shifting of focus to development. The U.S. had hoped the international community that did not 
send troops would support the development phase (Bruno, 2011). With NATO’s assumption of 
control over ISAF and the ensuing expansion, each NATO country was assigned specific PRTs. 
Unlike in Iraq, the U.S. preferred to work with the international community in Afghanistan. With 
so many different leaders though, the PRT program became more uncoordinated, and aid 
workers claimed that the indistinction between combatants and humanitarian workers put them at 
risk (Perito, 2011).  
Despite the bad reviews, PRTs continued to grow in number. A USAID program called 
the Quick Impact Project (QIP) was initiated in 2003, and was meant to “carry out short-term 
PEPPERDINE POLICY REVIEW VOLUME V – SPRING 2012 
 
stabilization activities” by making it easier for USAID officers in the PRTs to implement small 
projects, like irrigation systems, schools or clinics (Liskey, 2010) (USAID 1. , 2011). The QIP 
program ended in 2007, having accomplished over 440 projects (USAID 1. , 2011).  
The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) launched in December of 2002. It listed a 
priority in four goals: 1) “engage with public and private sector development”; 2) “partner with 
community leaders to close the freedom gap with projects to strengthen civil society, expand 
political participation, and lift the voices of women”; 3) “work with parents and educators to 
bridge the knowledge gap with better schools and more opportunities for higher education;” and 
4) “create economic, political and educational systems where women enjoy full and equal 
opportunities” (Stewart D. J., 2005, 407). The administration advertised MEPI well in the United 
States, and less so in the Middle East. The program’s expenditures for Fiscal Years 2002-2005 
totaled $239 million—which is barely above what the U.S. spent on civil society programs when 
such a policy did not exist in the 1990’s in the region, and which reportedly had very little effect 
(Stewart D. J., 2005, 407). The American public had become familiarized with the concept of 
government change as a legitimate policy. 
 By 2004, democratic reform in the entire Middle East “had become a central policy 
focus” (Stewart D. J., 2005, 409). The Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) was a grand plan 
that the administration had built up to the public that would bring about governmental change to 
Arab countries. It was written without any input from leaders of Middle Eastern countries. The 
GMEI was leaked and prematurely published, and faced a lot of criticism (Stewart D. J., 2005, 
410). All of the Middle Eastern leaders rejected the initiative, which forced major changes to the 
document (Stewart D. J., 2005, 410-411). The intention could not be undone though, and the 
goal of democracy in Afghanistan was only solidified. A joint declaration from President Bush 
and President Karzai on May 23, 2005, reinforced the relationship between the two and the U.S. 
commitment to “help ensure Afghanistan’s long-term security, democracy, and prosperity” 
(Karzai, 2005). It also allowed the U.S. military to use Afghan facilities, and announced that the 
U.S. would train and equip the Afghan military so that eventually they could provide security 
themselves.  
A new USAID civil assistance program was initiated in 2006. Called the Local 
Governance and Community Development Program (LGCD), it began to replace the Quick 
Impact Projects that were phased out a year later (Liskey, 2010). The goals were to assist the 
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Afghan government in unstable areas with “at-risk populations,” encourage local communities to 
participate in their own development, and address the underlying causes of instability and 
support for the insurgency” (USAID 2. , 2011). However, the LGCD Program and the PRT 
projects are not correlated with stability, have therefore not increased stability, and have not 
offered legitimacy to the Afghan government (Liskey, 2010). Only two studies were found to 
draw any positive correlation, which was ultimately undermined: “Germany’s overseas 
development assistance program agency BMZ found that development assistance improved 
attitudes among Afghans toward foreign forces and state legitimacy;” which was “quickly 
undone by increased perceptions of insecurity” (Liskey, 2010). Under pressure to demonstrate 
success, the U.S. insisted that the PRTs were in fact making progress and continued to support 
them, but with very limited resources.  
 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF 2006: DEMOCRACY AND COALITIONS  
President Bush’s second national security strategy was calmer and less powered by 
ideological language—but without losing its ideology. The very first paragraph of his preface 
letter clarifies that this strategy’s “most solemn obligation” is “to protect the security of the 
American people” (Bush, 2006, 2). He takes ownership of values rather than declaring them 
universal. He says freedom, democracy, and human dignity are integral to American history and 
“inspire nations throughout the world” (Bush, 2002, 2). He says that free nations are more 
peaceful, so it is a vested interest of the U.S. that other countries are free, which is an erroneous 
assumption considering that the United States is the longest existing democracy in the world and 
was engaged in two wars (Bush, 2002, 2). The document states that the United States will 
promote these values through ending tyranny, promoting effective democracies, and 
strengthening global free and fair trade (Bush, 2002, 6). Free governments “are accountable to 
their people, govern their territory effectively, and pursue economic and political policies that 
benefit their citizens,” all factors that are difficult to achieve in war-torn states, as exemplified in 
Afghanistan (Bush, 2002, 2). The determination to build democracies is impressive though. It 
makes the U.S. commitment to liberating the world one for generations to follow. It seems to 
have learned that democracy cannot be accomplished quickly in a country that has no experience 
with it—a dramatic change from the initial commentary at the onset of the war in Afghanistan. It 
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does, however, claim to have achieved democracy there, though it differentiates what an 
effective democracy is (Bush, 2002, 7-8).   
The document also puts a greater emphasis on working with the international community. 
Because the major problems that the United States faces are also problems that other countries 
face, and are problems that cross international borders, the best solution will come when 
countries work together (Bush, 2002, 2). In Afghanistan, the U.S. has always preferred to work 
with other countries, and wanted NATO nations to play a major role. Similar to the 2002 national 
security strategy, it takes initial responsibility by the U.S. as the leader, but is far more open and 
ready to work with the international community, recognizing the impact of a newly globalized 
world. When NATO countries slacked on their commitments, which was a major problem, the 
U.S. was forced to step in and provide the assistance (Jones, 2008, 5). It also says that 
governmental change has to come from within the country needing the change, and that the U.S. 
will offer encouragement (Bush, 2002, 38). In Afghanistan, the encouragement is very involved. 
Overall, the document says little about Afghanistan, an interesting fact but reflective of the 
administrations preferred focus on the Iraq War.  
THE DICHOTOMY ON THE GROUND: INSURGENTS AND HOPE ON THE RISE  
Things were not as good in Afghanistan as the administration liked to think they were. By 
April, 2005, the number of casualties associated with Operation Enduring Freedom began to 
grow (O'Hanlon, 2011, 11). The insurgency was growing and becoming more violent (Rubin, 
2006). A strategic plan called the Afghanistan Compact was issued in January of 2006, and 
assessed the situation as uncertain and called for strong U.S. support (Rubin, 2006). Challenges 
that the country faced included the growing insurgency, shelters in Pakistan, the corrupt and 
futile government, drug trafficking, and human development being bottom of the list. (Rubin, 
2006) If Iraq had not diverted attention away from Afghanistan, the problems of Afghanistan 
would be more visible to the public and the administration would not have had to take more 
responsibility for the growing problems in the country. Managerial problems probably would 
have been assessed and reformed.  
Other than these major issues, there were positive effects of U.S. foreign policy on the 
Afghan people. In 2008, a public opinion poll showed that Afghans were still optimistic about 
the future of their country, with 71 percent approving of the U.S. presence (Jones, 2008, 8). 76 
percent thought the Taliban overthrow was “a good thing,” which had been up at 88 percent the 
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year before, but is still admirable (Jones, 2008, 8). The economy was growing at an average of 
10 percent for the last three years, inflation averaged around 8.5 percent, and primary school 
enrollment went from 19 percent in 2001 to 87 percent in 2005 (Jones, 2008, 2). There was a lot 
to be fixed, but in 2008 it still seemed possible.  
THE 2008 CAMPAIGN 
President Obama called for a refocus to Afghanistan in his campaign in 2008. He 
recognized that the situation was deteriorating and said he would move troops from Iraq—a war 
he disapproved of—to Afghanistan (CFR.org, 2008). Critical of President Bush’s limiting 
policies in the country, Obama believed that sending troops would demonstrate to NATO that the 
U.S. was serious and would encourage them to send more, too (CFR.org, 2008). He also said he 
would loosen restrictions on NATO, so they could actually do the jobs they originally agreed to 
do (CFR.org, 2008). A proposal of $1 billion allocated to non-military assistance and 
safeguarded against corruption and spent in rural areas would help stabilize the country 
(CFR.org, 2008). He also thought that the U.S. should promote democracy through leading by 
example, namely “banning torture, extraordinary rendition and by closing the detention facility at 
Guantanamo Bay;” hypocrisy feeds mistrust of American purposes and principles (CFR.org, 
2008). He also planned to support nongovernmental organizations that provide civic assistance in 
authoritarian states, and proposed a “Rapid Response Fund” to “provide foreign aid, debt relief, 
technical assistance and investment packages that show the people of newly hopeful countries 
that democracy and peace deliver,” and promised support from the U.S. (CFR.org, 2008). 
Overall, President Obama did support democracy promotion as a role for U.S. foreign policy, but 
it was not central to his policy on the Middle East.  
PRESIDENT OBAMA IN OFFICE: A NEW STRATEGY 
 Upon inauguration, President Obama followed through on his campaign promises. He 
sent 17,000 more troops to Afghanistan, which was counterbalanced by the combat troop 
drawdown in Iraq (Bruno, 2011). The reinforcements were requested by the generals months 
prior, and approved by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, whom the President had brought into 
his administration from the prior. The troops were to focus on countering the resurgent Taliban 
and securing the border with Pakistan, and the overall strategy goals were narrowed to aims 
“such as preventing and limiting terrorist safe havens (Bruno, 2011). In March, an interagency 
plan linked Afghanistan and Pakistan because of al Qaeda’s bases there, and increased aid to 
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Pakistan to dismantle them (Bruno, 2011). It also called for 4,000 more troops to train Afghan 
security forces, which Karzai supported (Bruno, 2011). The following month, the U.S. had 
secured promises of an additional 5,000 NATO troops to help in the training, and foreign 
security forces for the presidential election in November, which elected Karzai to another term in 
a disputed outcome (Bruno, 2011). In December, another 30,000 American troops were 
promised, bringing the total to 98,000  (Bruno, 2011). The promise to refocus on Afghanistan 
was fulfilled. 
COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS (COIN): LESSONS FROM IRAQ  
A new military strategy coincided with the replacement of generals. U.S. commander 
General David D. McKiernan was replaced with the “fresh thinking” and “fresh eyes” of General 
Stanley A. McChrystal, an expert in counterinsurgency and Special Forces operations (Bruno, 
2011). One of General McChrystal’s first steps was to set up a Pakistan Afghanistan 
Coordination Cell of 400 officers who would be focused on Afghanistan only for the next several 
years (Boot, 2009). The traditional pattern was for troops to serve six to twelve months in a war 
zone before they are relocated, with the result that the territory is unfamiliar to each new group 
of soldiers and there is “a disproportionate share of casualties when they first arrive” (Boot, 
2009). Culturally in tribal Afghanistan, personal relationships between military leaders and tribal 
leaders are incredibly important, and the roles are often intertwined. By bringing the same group 
of troops to the same location time and again after their breaks at home allowed for a similar type 
of relationship to develop with the tribal leaders in a region—an incredibly important change for 
the strategy (Boot, 2009). This plan also allows the soldiers to become experts in their 
deployments, and promises much greater success overall.  
A Tactical Directive issued by McChrystal as the commander of ISAF was released on 
July 6, 2009. Some of the document has been classified, but the released portions offer the public 
a better concept of the change in the strategy towards Afghanistan. In it, the goal is to “defeat the 
insurgency threatening the stability of Afghanistan” by gaining support of the population 
(McChrystal, 2009, 1). He goes on, “we will not win based on the number of Taliban we kill, but 
instead on our ability to separate insurgents from the center of gravity—the people,” and he 
demands respect and protection for the Afghan population. “This is different from conventional 
combat… We must avoid the trap of winning tactical victories—but suffering strategic defeats—
by causing civilian casualties” (McChrystal, 2009, 1). This new form of fighting, 
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Counterinsurgency Operations, was tried and proved successful in Iraq. Though his tactics were 
good and efforts to turn the situation in Afghanistan were real, General McChrystal resigned 
after a Rolling Stones article published his relentless, crude comments about his boss, the 
commander-in-chief Obama.  
President Obama was careful to clarify that the resignation of General McChrystal did 
not mean a change in policy; it was just a change in personnel. General David Petraeus had 
commanded all forces in Iraq and the counterinsurgency strategy there before moving to 
commander of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), and then being appointed the 
replacement of General McChrystal in Afghanistan (Lee, 2010). General Petraeus is a major 
proponent of COIN, and under his command, the strategy took root in Afghanistan (Lee, 2010).  
Counterinsurgency operation is focused on winning the hearts and minds of the target 
population. It stresses multiple factors that the military needs to consider to succeed. It stresses 
the importance of human rights, because the security and well being of the population are 
necessary in order to gain legitimacy in their eyes (Sepp, 2005, 9). Law enforcement will 
discover and arrest insurgents, and a well trained, honest force is more capable of collecting 
intelligence; a ratio of twenty police to each 1,000 civilians is the general ratio required (Sepp, 
2005, 9). Engaging in population control entails keeping tabs on the population through check 
points or ID checks in order to know who is where, and to prevent the movement of insurgents 
(Sepp, 2005, 10). Encouragement for the political process is central to the COIN strategy—
civilians should engage in it by voting and demonstrating that insurgents would be better 
represented through a legitimate process (Sepp, 2005, 10). Counterinsurgent warfare involves 
allied foreign militaries to provide security and training until the indigenous forces are capable 
(Sepp, 2005, 10). Secure borders are necessary in order to prevent terrorists from crossing 
borders and infiltration (Sepp, 2005, 11). Finally, in order to quickly respond to emergencies in 
an organized manner, a strong executive authority needs to be in charge of the entire operation 
(Sepp, 2005, 11).    
General Petraeus took the doctrine very seriously and applied it to all aspects of 
Afghanistan. New contracting guidelines were issued because contract spending and who 
benefits are integral to Afghanistan’s economy (Petraeus, 2010). It stipulates that purchases for 
construction, goods, and services should be made from Afghan firms to “bolster economic 
growth, stability, and Afghan goodwill toward their government and ISAF,” and that contracts 
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should hire Afghans first, and sub-contract with trustworthy Afghan companies whenever 
possible (Petraeus, 2010). Commanders should be well aware of those that they make contracts 
with, to ensure that money supports those who build “relationships with local businesses and 
community leaders,” and is not funneled into insurgent hands (Petraeus, 2010). He basically 
forewarns that contracting needs to be done responsibly.  
ISAF also posts a list of behavioral guidelines for soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and 
civilians that Petraeus wrote and updated with feedback. They include points about earning trust 
and confidence from the Afghan people, living among them and consulting local citizens in 
location of joint bases and combat outposts (Patraeus, 2010). Another is fight hard and fight with 
discipline: “Hunt the enemy aggressively, but use only the firepower needed to win a fight” in 
order to avoid killing civilians (Patraeus, 2010). Other points are identify corrupt officials, hold 
what we secure, be a good guest, and walk—stop by don’t drive by. These guidelines change the 
way war is fought and bring the military to the civilian population. They infiltrate every aspect of 
Afghan life, and Petraeus is a known detail-oriented commander who could handle it.  
NATIONAL SECURITY OF 2010: AMERICA AS THE CAPACITY BUILDER 
President Obama’s National Security Strategy is a very comprehensive, well thought out 
plan. In the preface, he calls to increase American strength, security and ability, adding that 
America should “appeal to the aspirations of peoples around the world” (Obama, 2010, i). He 
plans for several approaches to reach this aim. President Obama calls upon traditionally domestic 
issues, economy, education, innovation, and energy, as a major feature of the strategy. He plans 
to strengthen America’s diplomatic capability to “compliment” the military (Obama, 2010, i). 
Like President Bush, President Obama calls for better integration and cooperation with the 
international community. He reiterates that it is a national security interest to strengthen and 
modernize allies to take care of themselves, adding a humanitarian element to President Bush’s 
call for free governments (Obama, 2010, ii). Also like the 2006 strategy, this one believes in the 
universality of American values, and the justice and exportation of democracy.  
The report clearly discusses Afghanistan. Declaring the war there as “only one element of 
our strategic environment,” it stresses that defeat of al Qaeda is the main end point. It connects 
Pakistan to this battle, as these countries are the “frontline,” shifting focus away from Iraq 
(Obama, 2010, 4). The strategy also outlines exactly what the different sectors involved with 
Afghanistan are meant to do in order to accomplish an Afghanistan that cannot be used as a safe 
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haven for terrorists, and one strong enough to resist overthrow by the Taliban (Obama, 2010, 
20). The military, working with ISAF, will target the insurgency, secure population centers, and 
increase efforts to train Afghan security forces (Obama, 2010, 21). The U.S. government will 
work with the UN and the Afghan government “to improve accountable and effective 
governance,” and combat corruption (Obama, 2010, 21). The U.S. will also “foster a relationship 
with Pakistan” so that together they can beat al Qaeda. On building stabilization in post-conflict 
zones, the strategy explains that those governments and the “political will of their leaders” 
sincerely affect US efforts, a restraint around which the U.S. will try to design policy (Obama, 
2010, 26-27). Notably, it does not list building an Afghan state as a key security aim. The 
document reserves the right to use force, but stresses that force will be a last resort—a comment 
that describes the presidents character rather than U.S. action, considering involvement in two 
wars. 
AS THE WAR WAS FOUGHT 
In 2009, President Obama had announced the plan for troop withdrawal along with the 
massive surge. He was determined to defeat al Qaeda and hand the reins over to the Afghan 
government. The withdrawal plans called for security operations to begin being handed over to 
Afghan security in the summer of 2011, conditions permitting. A report one year later would 
announce how conditions had changed. The White House review was released on December 16, 
2010, intimated progress “in clearing the Taliban from Kandahar and Helmand provinces” where 
they had been very strongly based (Masters, 2010). Positive responses testified that the surge had 
only been completed in the fall and was “already having a considerable impact,” and public 
opinion was slow to realize it (Masters, 2010). Afghans themselves were slow to recognize it, 
and public support for the insurgency waned with the arrival of 30,000 extra troops (Bajoria I., 
2010). Though there were other challenges and progress was unstable, the report announced that 
the July drawdown was on track, clearly restating as long as conditions permitted.  
The effort to prepare the Afghan government and to win hearts and minds was in process. 
A document called the Afghanistan National Development Strategy: Prioritization and 
Implementation Plan, 2010-2013, was published on July 20, 2010. It stated that in collaboration 
with the government of Afghanistan and the international community, an “action plan for 
improved governance, economic and social development, and security” was agreed upon for the 
Afghan government to follow (Ministry of Finance, 2010-2010, 12). It laid out the country’s 
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aspiration to be a strong, independent Islamic constitutional democracy by 2020, which has a 
robust capitalistic economy with respect for human rights and justice (Ministry of Finance, 2010-
2010, 12). It addressed each issue the country faced, from good governance, accelerating 
agriculture and rural development, to the transition to an Afghan-led security force and problems 
of narcotics. The plan outlined policy steps that would guide the government’s actions.  
Richard Holbrooke, President Obama’s special representative to Afghanistan and 
Pakistan from 2009 until his death in December, 2010, had been instrumental in pushing for 
more civilian related issues (Masters, 2010). Holbrooke’s accomplishments included tripling the 
number of U.S. civilian personnel to more than 1,000 people, ending the focus on poppy 
eradication as it was detrimental to Afghan farmers and therefore counterproductive, putting 
effort on President Karzai to improve the corruption issue, and voicing the need to negotiate with 
the Taliban (Bajoria I., 2010). In 2010, President Obama still would not speak with these 
opponents, even though nearly fifty US, Pakistani, and Afghani regional experts sent a letter 
explaining the importance of a settlement (Bajoria I., 2010).  
A battle about the war was waging in the U.S. as well. Republicans and Democrats made 
very vocal arguments in favor and against the war, respectively, adding another element to the 
decisions that had to be made. Republicans are adamantly against a deadline for the troop 
drawdown (Bajoria II., 2010). President Obama announced it to please his Democratic base, who 
are adamantly against continuation of the war (Bajoria II., 2010). He has had to walk a fine line 
between convincing the Taliban and insurgents that the U.S. is serious about the war, and 
fulfilling his promise to the American public (Masters, 2010). Disagreement on an action plan in 
the White House was immense, as well (Masters, 2010). Further, the economic and debt crises 
were well underway, and Americans were concerned with the billions of dollars being spent on 
the war (Bajoria II., 2010). And finally, critics of counterinsurgency operations vocalized their 
unease with the conditionality component to COIN (Gentile, 2010). They claim that it takes 
control out of your hands when all you do is sit back and wait for the population’s heart to prefer 
yours over the insurgents. They insist that a time table for troop drawdown means nothing when 
conditions are attached to it—another argument that the public has not picked up on. A leader is 
certainly needed to make decisions in with all this disagreement.   
Improvement in the country continued into 2011. General David Petraeus reported to 
Congress in March, 2011 on the conditions in Afghanistan, which follow. Progress had been 
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achieved, and the “security bubble” around Kabul had expanded (O'Hanlon S. B., 2011). Afghan 
security forces were improving so much that ISAF thought that only 30 percent of population 
center provinces were secure in 2010, and 50 percent were secure by the time of the report 
(O'Hanlon S. B., 2011). Further, 45 percent of Afghans feel safe moving about, which is an 
improvement of 12 percent from the prior year (O'Hanlon S. B., 2011). However, gains are 
fragile and the amount of violence had gone up from the prior year.  
On May 1, 2011, President Obama authorized a Special Operations Unit to go into 
Pakistan and kill Osama bin Laden. This success was praised the world over. With the leader of 
al Qaeda killed, the U.S. followed through on its first withdrawal of 30,000 troops in July, 
bringing the remainder to 70,000 (Hass, 2011). The decision brought much concern and relief. 
Those opposed to the drawdown think that security is on the horizon and has yet to be 
accomplished (Hass, 2011). They point to the incredible security gains in the last year, and say 
those gains need to be consolidated and expanded; “Regional Command East—the vast, 
mountainous region between Kabul and Pakistan where the Haqqani Network, the Taliban, the 
Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, and al-Qaeda have their strongholds” has yet to be secured (Hass, 
2011). Those in favor to the drawdown claim that the number of troops needed in Afghanistan 
are much lower—25,000 to do counterterrorist operations and continue training Afghan security 
would be enough (Hass, 2011). They continue, more troops will not be able to solve the problem 
of the Taliban strongholds in Pakistan or the internal Afghan divides that perpetuate problems, 
and with strong diplomacy with the Taliban, U.S. presence is no longer needed (Hass, 2011). The 
drawdown went on, however, and time will tell.  
Just today, December 5, 2011, world leaders convened in Bonn, Germany to discuss the 
exit strategy for all foreign troops—exactly ten years after a meeting in the same place to plan 
Afghanistan’s future. The results are not out yet, but they discussed ideas about making 
Afghanistan an economic trading hub, and tapping into their vast mineral sources to help the 
country sustain itself. Afghanistan truly seems to be on its path to liberation of foreigners. At 
least the U.S. is making it seem that way. 
CONCLUSION 
President Bush’s strategy in Afghanistan developed quickly in the beginning, and became 
static early on. The initial success of Operation Enduring Freedom in overthrowing the Taliban 
in three months and instituting a process for establishing democracy is an incredible 
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accomplishment and testimony to a new age of warfare. When the question of what to do next 
arose, it followed that stability became a priority, and therefore democracy. Success at Bonn and 
the speed with which such a complicated matter was dealt with should have been a warning 
though, necessitating caution. Instead, the administration called Afghanistan liberated, and the 
first two goals of destroying al Qaeda bases in the country and overthrowing the Taliban 
government were accomplished. Two elections held prompted the government to classify 
Afghanistan as a democracy in the National Security Strategy of 2006, and the third goal was 
accomplished. Yet Afghanistan was not stable, and so the U.S. government continued its 
unfocused work there, all the while the insurgency grew.  
President Obama’s strategy was clearly much more focused on Afghanistan. President 
Obama ensured that he followed through with his campaign promises to the American public, 
but also tried to listen to the concerns of the commanders. Applying the lessons learned from 
Iraq, the counterinsurgency operations model was implemented in Afghanistan. Finding a man 
that he could trust and work with in General Petraeus, President Obama moved forward with the 
effort to win the hearts and minds of Afghanis. Security was slowly and fragilely growing in the 
country, but the decisive victory in the killing of bin Laden changed the tide for good. On 
November 30, 2011, a total of 1,841 Americans and 969 foreigners had died in the war 
(O'Hanlon I. S., 2011). The President finalized the decision to bring the first round of troops 
home, and to have the rest home by 2014. 
 The strategy in Afghanistan has been dramatically changed. Going from a terribly run 
war with high public approval ratings in both Afghanistan and the U.S., the change in policy 
coincided with both a much better run war, well defined strategy, and a decrease in public 
support in both countries. It is known that counterinsurgency operations are painful in the 
beginning, resulting in higher numbers of casualties, but their success in the long term outweighs 
the initial problems.  
Arguments in favor and against staying in the war are persuasive; however, pulling the 
troops out is the correct decision. This policy weans Afghanistan off dependence on foreign 
troops at an early stage, and forces them to fend for themselves. The chances that U.S. troops 
could affect the rugged mountainous region in the east, or secure the border well enough to seal 
the Pashtuns into Pakistan are minimal. If a civil war erupts, as so many are predicting, then 
those soldiers who are trained and equipped by foreign soldiers will come out on top. They are 
PEPPERDINE POLICY REVIEW VOLUME V – SPRING 2012 
 
the ones working for the government. They are largely of the same ethnicity—Tajik—and might 
not break off into their tribes. And the U.S. will keep an eye on the country. A civil war will 
probably not prompt American action after 2012, but a genocide would. Afghanistan is better off 
in Afghan hands. The United States will accomplish what it can by 2012, conditions permitting.  
 
REFERENCES 
Bajoria I., J. (2010, December 14). After Holbrooke, New Afghan Tests. Retrieved Deceber 5, 
2011, from Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/after-holbrooke-
new-afghan-tests/p23632 
Bajoria II., J. (2010, October 28). Foreign Policy and the 2110 Midterms: War in Afghanistan. 
Retrieved December 5, 2011, from Council on Foreign Relations: 
http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/foreign-policy-2010-midterms-war-afghanistan/p23259 
Boot, M. (2009, June 17). General McChrystal's New Way of War. Retrieved December 4, 2011, 
from Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/general-mcchrystals-
new-way-war/p19653 
Bruno, G. (2011). U.S. War in Afghanistan: Interactive Timeline. (R. McMahon, Editor, & C. o. 
Relations, Producer) Retrieved November 30, 2011, from Council on Foreign Relations: 
http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-war-afghanistan/p20018 
Bush, G. W. (2006). The National Security Strategy of the United States. United States 
Government. 
Bush, G. W. (2002). The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. United 
States Government. 
CFR.org. (2008). Barak Obama. Retrieved December 4, 2011, from Campaign Issues: 
http://www.cfr.org/experts/world/barack-obama/b11603#4 
Dobbins, J. (2009, November 4). Our Man in Kabul. Foreign Affairs . Council on Foreign 
Relations. 
Foust, J. (2011, February 8). Actually, Karzai is right about PRTs. Foreign Policy Magazine . 
Retrieved 2011 
Gentile, C. G. (2010, December 16). The 'Conditions-Based' Afghan Loophole. Retrieved 
December 5, 2011, from Council on Foreign Relations: 
http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/conditions-based-afghan-loophole/p23622 
PEPPERDINE POLICY REVIEW VOLUME V – SPRING 2012 
 
Gossman, P. (2001, Winter). Afghanistan in the Balance. Middle East Report (221). Middle East 
Research and Information Project. 
Hass, M. B. (2011, June 23). Cauging the US Commitment in Afghanistan. Retrieved December 
5, 2011, from Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/gauging-us-
commitment-afghanistan/p25336 
ISAF. (2011). About ISAF. Retrieved December 3, 2011, from History: 
http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html 
James M. Lindsay, a. M. (2001, October 10). The Wider War to Come: America's Campaign 
Against Terrorism Will Target Groups and Countries Around the World. Retrieved 
December 12, 2011, from Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org/us-strategy-
and-politics/wider-war-come-americas-campaign-against-terrorism-target-groups-
countries-around-world/p6290 
Jones, S. G. (2008). Testimony: Getting Back on Track in Afghanistan. Washington, DC: 
RAND. 
Karzai, G. W. (2005, May 23). Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic 
Partnership. Washington, DC, USA. 
Knight, C. (2001, October 9). Essential Elements Missing in the National Security Strategy of 
2002. Boston, Massachusettes. 
Kumar, R. (2001, December 12). Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved December 3, 2011, 
from A Roadmap for Afghanistan: http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/roadmap-
afghanistan/p8671 
Liskey, T. B. (2010). Analytics and Action in Afghanistan. Washington , DC: NDU Press. 
Masters, J. B. (2010, December 16). Reviewing the Afghan War. Retrieved December 5, 2011, 
from Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/reviewing-afghan-
war/p23650 
Ministry of Finance, Department of Policy. (2010-2010). Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy: Prioritization and Implementation Plan. Kabul: Internatinoal Conference on 
Afghanistan. 
Obama, B. H. (2010). National Security Strategy. United States Government. 
O'Hanlon, I. S. (2011). Afghanistan Index. Brookings Institute. 
O'Hanlon, S. B. (2011, March 25). Slogging it out in Afghanistan. The Washington Post . 
PEPPERDINE POLICY REVIEW VOLUME V – SPRING 2012 
 
Patraeus, D. (2010, August). COMISAF's Counterinsurgency (COIN) Guidance. Retrieved 
December 4, 2011, from Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force: 
http://www.isaf.nato.int/from-the-commander/from-the-commander/comisaf-s-
counterinsurgency-guidance.html 
Perito, R. M. (2011, December 3). The US Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in 
Afghanistan. Special Report . Washington, DC, USA. 
Petraeus, D. H. (2010, September 8). COMISAF's Counterinsurgency (COIN) Contracting 
Guidlines. Kabul, Afghanistan: NATO/ISAF. 
Rubin, B. R. (2006, April 10). Afghanistan on "Life Support" Warns Council Report. Retrieved 
Decmber 4, 2011, from Council on Foreign Relations: 
http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/afghanistan-life-support-warns-council-report/p10399 
Sepp, K. I. (2005). Best Practices in Counterinsurgency. Military Review. 
Stewart, D. J. (2005). The Greater Middle East and Reform in the Bush Administration's 
Ideological Imagination. Geographical Review , 95 (3), 400-424. 
Stewart, R. W. (2003). Operation ENDURING FREEDOM October 2001-March 2002. The 
United States Army in Afghanistan . 
USAID, 1. (2011, December). PRT Quick Impact Projects. Retrieved December 3, 2011, from 
USAID Afghanistan: 
http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/Activity/91/PRT_Quick_Impact_Projects 
USAID, 2. (2011, December). Local Governance and Community Development. Retrieved 
December 3, 2011, from USAID Afghanistan: 
http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/Activity/90/Local_Governance_and_Community
_Development_LGCD 
World Fact Book. (Updated Weekly). Retrieved 2011 йил 1-March from Central Inteligance 
Agency: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html  
PEPPERDINE POLICY REVIEW VOLUME V – SPRING 2012 
 
 
